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CASE NOTE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—Challenging Anti-Commerce State Regulatory
Schemes in Light of the Supreme Court’s Admonition of Protectionist Alcohol
Regulations; Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).
Mike Figge*

INTRODUCTION
Not long ago, wine aﬁcionados seeking an eclectic vintage or specialty wine
were left with their thirst unquenched if the local wine shop did not carry the
wine they sought. 1 But today, the advent of the Internet has given individuals
access to wineries from across the nation.2 From California to New York, nearly
every vineyard operates a web site offering their wines for purchase.3 However,
even with increased ease of access via the Internet, many wine lovers still cannot
get their favorite wines because states restrict the sale and transportation of alcohol
within their borders; a power they received upon the repeal of prohibition. 4
Prohibition, the complete ban of manufacture and distribution of alcohol
throughout the country, ended in 1933 with the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment to
the United States Constitution.5 With ratiﬁcation came the expansion of state
regulatory powers under section two of the Amendment which states that “[t]he
transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the
United States for delivery or use there in of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”6 Since then, states have created discriminatory
regulatory schemes that protect in-state producers of alcohol from out-of-state
competition.7 Some states allow all wineries to ship wines ordered online directly to

*Candidate for J.D., University of Wyoming, 2009. I would like to thank my family and
friends for their support during this project. I would also like to thank Professor Stephen Feldman
for his insight and guidance.
1
See generally Possible Anti-competitive Barriers to e-commerce: Wine, A Report from the
Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, July 2003, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf
(last visited September 7, 2007).
2

Id. at 1.

3

See, e.g., Figge Cellars, http://www.ﬁggecellars.com/ (last visited November 27, 2007);
Snowden Vineyards, http://www.snowdenvineyards.com/ourWines-overview.htm (last visited
November 27, 2007); Atwater Estate Vineyards, http://www.atwatervineyards.com/ (last visited
November 27, 2007).
4

U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.

5

Id.

6

Id.

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4-205.04(c) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 19F
(2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4303.232 (West 2006).
7
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consumers’ homes.8 Others require the wineries to ship their wines to a distributor
for pickup.9 Still others, like Utah, prohibit shipments of alcohol within its borders
altogether.10 Further, some states allow direct-to-consumer shipping by in-state
retailers but prohibit direct-to-consumer shipments by out-of-state retailers.11

Granholm v. Heald
In 2003, Domaine Alfred, a small California winery, ﬁled suit in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.12 The winery
challenged Michigan’s laws prohibiting the direct shipment of wine to consumers
by out-of-state wineries while simultaneously allowing direct shipping by instate wineries.13 The plaintiff argued that Michigan’s shipping laws violated the
dormant Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution.14 The State argued
that section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment abrogates the State’s Commerce
Clause responsibilities when regulations pertain to alcohol within the state’s

8

See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204 (2006).

9

E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-348(b)(3) (2006).

10

UTAH CODE ANN. § 32A-8-505 (2006).

11

See, e.g., 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-12 (2006).

12

Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that state regulations that beneﬁt
in-state interest and burden out-of-state interests unevenly violate the negative implications of the
Commerce Clause and are not saved by section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment).
13

Id. at 520-22.

14

Id. at 520. For an excellent description of the Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence see,
e.g., Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Ore., 511 U.S. 93 (1994).
The Commerce Clause provides that ‘[t]he Congress shall have power . . . [t]o
regulate Commerce . . . among the several states.’ Though phrased as a grant
of regulatory power to Congress, the Clause has long been under stood to have
a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the states the power unjustiﬁably to discriminate
against or burden the interstate ﬂow of articles of commerce. The Framers granted
Congress plenary authority over interstate commerce in the conviction that in order
to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the tendencies toward economic
Balkanization that had plagued relations among the Colonies and later among the
States under the Articles of Confederation.
Id. at 99 (internal citations omitted).
Consistent with these principles . . . the ﬁrst step in analyzing any law subject to
judicial scrutiny under the negative Commerce Clause is to determine whether it
regulates evenhandedly with only ‘incidental’ effects on interstate commerce, or
discriminates against interstate commerce. As we use the term here, discrimination
simply means differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests
that beneﬁts the former and burdens the later. If a restriction on commerce
is discriminatory, it is virtually per se invalid. By contrast, nondiscriminatory
regulations that have only incidental effects on interstate commerce are valid unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative
local beneﬁts.
Id. at 100 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
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borders.15 The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that the
Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment does not immunize all liquor laws from the Commerce
Clause.16 The court also held that the State’s failure to prove it could not meet
its regulatory objectives through a non-discriminatory alternative invalidated the
state law.17 The State appealed.18
Similarly, in 2004, two small out-of-state wineries challenged New York
laws regarding direct shipments of wine to consumers, again in federal court.19
The plaintiffs claimed a direct shipping exception in New York’s laws, allowing
only wineries whose wines are made from at least seventy-ﬁve percent of New
York grown grapes to ship directly to consumers, impermissibly discriminated
against interstate commerce.20 The plaintiffs also claimed that to require out-ofstate wineries to establish a physical presence in the state to qualify for the direct
shipping license discriminated against interstate commerce.21 Like Michigan, New
York argued that the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment affords the State broad authority to
regulate alcohol as it sees ﬁt even if to do so violates the Commerce Clause.22 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that were it regulating
a commodity other than alcohol, the physical presence requirement could create
signiﬁcant dormant Commerce Clause problems.23 However, the court held
that section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment affords the states the ability to
15
Heald, 342 F.3d at 520 (arguing that the Michigan direct shipment law is a permitted
exercise of State power under section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment because it is not mere
economic protectionism).
16
Id. at 524 (concluding that Michigan did not provide sufﬁcient evidence that discrimination
between in-state and out-of-state wineries, furthers the state’s goals of temperance, ensuring orderly
market conditions, and raising revenue, much less that no reasonable nondiscriminatory means exist
to achieve these goals).
17

Id. at 527.

18

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).

19

Swedeburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that section two of the
Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment affords states the ability to create alcohol regulations that violate the
negative implications of the Commerce Clause).
20

Id. at 229. New York’s law required a licensed winery that sells directly-to-consumers, to
maintain an in-state presence. Id. New York also allowed wineries that produce less than 150,000
gallons per year and use seventy-ﬁve percent New York grown grapes to obtain a farm winery license.
Id. A licensed farm winery could, in addition to selling directly to consumers, sell and ship its wine
to another licensed winery, wholesaler, or retailer. Id.
21

Id. The Second Circuit held that New York’s requirement that licensed wineries maintain an
in-state presence ensures accountability because it facilitates the State’s compliance enforcement. Id.
at 236. Further, the Second Circuit held that because all wineries must either utilize the three-tier
system or obtain a physical presence to be eligible for direct shipping privileges, the law restricts
both in-state and out-of-state interests evenhandedly. Id. at 238.
22
Id. at 229. New York argued its “regulatory scheme is exempted from dormant Commerce
Clause scrutiny, as it is a proper exercise of the State’s authority under the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment
to regulate the importation and distribution of alcohol for delivery or use within its borders.” Id.
23

Id. at 238.
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regulate alcohol in any manner they choose.24 Thus, the Court of Appeals upheld
the New York law.25 The plaintiffs appealed.26
In the landmark case Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme
Court consolidated these two cases to answer the following question: “Does a
state’s regulatory scheme that permits in-state wineries [to ship alcohol directly
to consumers] but restricts the ability of out-of-state wineries to do so violate
the dormant Commerce Clause in light of section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst
Amendment?”27 The Court held, in a ﬁve-to-four decision, contrary to the States’
interpretation, that section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment does not abrogate
nondiscrimination principles of the Commerce Clause in alcohol regulations.28
The Court held that the “Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment did not give states the
authority to pass non-uniform laws in order to discriminate against out-of-state
goods, a privilege they had not enjoyed at any earlier time.”29 To the contrary, the
majority held that states have broad power to police alcohol within their borders
but must do so on evenhanded terms.30 Furthermore, the Court found that the
failure to adequately demonstrate the need for discriminatory regulations by
the states required those regulations be found invalid in the face of traditional
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.31
This case note traces the development of alcohol regulations beginning with
the nation’s inception, through prohibition and the current regulatory climate.32
It demonstrates that, with the exception of prohibition, the courts historically
treat alcohol as a normal good in interstate commerce.33 It also shows that section
two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment gives states authority to regulate alcohol to
further temperance goals, raise revenue, and restrict sales to minors, but does
not authorize states to create laws that subject out-of-state interests to greater
regulatory hurdles than in-state interests.34 Further, this case note illustrates and
focuses on the need for the U.S. Supreme Court to revisit its assertion that the
three-tier system of alcohol distribution is “unquestionably legitimate.”35
24

Swedenburg, 358 F.3d at 238.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 229.

27

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 471 (2005) (internal quotations omitted).

28

Id. at 484.

29

Id. at 485-86. The Wilson Act was codiﬁed at 27 U.S.C § 121 and the Webb-Kenyon Act
was codiﬁed at 27 U.S.C. § 122. Id. at 482-83.
30

Id. at 493.

31

Id.

32

See infra notes 39–100 and accompanying text.

33

See infra notes 39–100 and accompanying text.

34

See infra notes 147–219 and accompanying text.

35

See infra notes 188–218 and accompanying text. See also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting
North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990) (holding that the three-tier system of
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BACKGROUND
The Dormant Commerce Clause
The United States Constitution states that Congress shall have power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes.”36 The United States Supreme Court has interpreted this clause
to infer a negative implication on the states known as the dormant Commerce
Clause.37 The dormant Commerce Clause prohibits states from enacting laws that
favor in-state interests over out-of-state interests.38

The History of Alcohol Regulation and the Commerce Clause in the United
States
The regulation of alcohol has always been subject to careful, albeit disparate,
review.39 “Since the founding of our republic, power over the regulation of
liquor has ebbed and ﬂowed between the federal government and the states.”40
The disparity in regulation began with promulgation of the “Original Package
Doctrine” by Chief Justice Marshall which allowed alcohol to be shipped directly
to consumer’s homes.41 Later, the Supreme Court recognized the states’ broad
authority to regulate alcohol free from traditional Commerce Clause principles
thereby disbanding the practice of shipping alcohol directly to consumers.42

alcohol distribution is “unquestionably legitimate”)). “Under the . . . [three-tier] regulatory system,
there are three levels of liquor distributors: out-of-state distillers/suppliers, state-licensed wholesalers,
and state-licensed retailers. Distillers/suppliers may sell to only licensed wholesalers[, and] . . .
[l]icensed wholesalers, in turn, may sell to licensed retailers, [and] other licensed wholesalers.” Id.
at 428.
36

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

37

See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824). Justice Marshall wrote that the
power to regulate interstate commerce “can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must
be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant.” Id.
38
See Brown-Forman Distillers v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986) (holding
that New York ABC regulation mandating liquor producers post prices on a monthly basis and
seek ABC Board approval before changing prices in other states ﬁrst is a violation of the Commerce
Clause); Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm., 432 U.S. 333 (1997) (holding the
requirement that all apple producers use a state mandated grading system when the source state’s
grading system indicates higher quality produce violates the Commerce Clause by beneﬁtting instate producers of apples at the expense of out-of-state producers).
39

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 477. Justice Kennedy discusses the history of this nation’s alcohol
regulations focusing on the changes in position the Court has taken over time. Id.
40

Castlewood Int’l Corp. v. Simon, 596 F.2d 638, 641 (5th Cir. 1979).

41

Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1927) (holding that the delivery of wine
directly to consumer was permissible so long as it remained in its original package for shipping).
42

The License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 579 (1847) (upholding state statutes which tax
in-state producers of alcohol more favorably than out-of-state producers of alcohol).
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Allowing states unfettered regulatory power remained the trend until late
in the nineteenth century when the Supreme Court decided Leisy v. Harden,
a case dealing with the regulation of out-of-state produced liquor.43 In Leisy, a
brewery in Illinois shipped beer to Iowa.44 Upon arrival the alcohol was offered
for sale in its original packaging.45 Iowa seized the beer on the ground that its sale
violated the State’s prohibition on shipments of alcohol for sale within the state.46
Leisy, the seller, brought suit seeking return of his merchandise.47 The Supreme
Court struck down Iowa’s prohibition of direct shipments as an impermissible
regulation on interstate commerce so long as those shipments remain in their
original packaging.48 For the time being, direct shipping remained out of the
states’ regulatory ambit.49
Shortly after the Supreme Court’s decision in Leisy, Congress responded
by enacting the Wilson Act with the intention of closing the original package
loophole.50 However, even in light of their recent victory in Congress, the states
were still bound to the nondiscrimination principles of the dormant Commerce
Clause.51 This reemphasis on the nondiscrimination principle arose through a
series of decisions by the Supreme Court. 52 Thus, the Court rejected Congress’s
mandate by holding that the Wilson Act did not authorize application of state
regulatory laws to alcohol still in transit.53 Further, the Court held that the Wilson
Act did not prohibit individuals from ordering liquor for personal consumption
from out-of-state vendors.54
43

Leisy v. Harden, 135 U.S. 100 (1890) (holding that Iowa statute affecting liquor being
shipped from outside the state is in violation of anti-discrimination principles of the Commerce
Clause).
44

Id. at 124–25.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

See generally Leisy, 135 U.S. 100 (1890).

49

See id.

50

The Wilson Act, Ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (codiﬁed at 27 U.S.C. § 121 (1890)). Congress
responded to the effects of Leisy v. Harden which abrogated the ability of state alcohol regulation
agencies to regulate out-of-state liquor in a manner that discriminated against interstate commerce.
See Leisy, 135 U.S. at 123. Essentially, the Wilson Act gave states the power to regulate all liquor
regardless of whether it is or remains in interstate commerce. Id.
51
See, e.g., In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 565 (1891) (holding that Congress has the power to
provide that certain designated subjects of interstate commerce shall be governed by a rule which
divests them of that character at an earlier time than would otherwise be the case).
52
See Vance v. W.A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438, 456–57 (1898); see also Rhodes v. Iowa,
170 U.S. 412, 422–26 (1898) (holding the Wilson Act to allow direct-to-consumer shipping); Scott
v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 110 (1897) (holding that the Wilson Act does not allow states to regulate
liquor in a way that discriminates against out-of-state producers).
53

Id.

54

See Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107 (1897).
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Congress again responded to the Court’s actions, this time by passing
legislation that stripped liquor of its interstate characteristics.55 In passing the
Webb-Kenyon Act, Congress again returned to the states the ability to regulate
alcohol within their borders.56 This time the Supreme Court upheld the law by
reasoning Congress was free to “divest” an article of commerce of its interstate
characteristic through its commerce power.57 The Court’s new stance gave states
complete control over alcohol, yet still did not abrogate their accountability to the
Commerce Clause.58
The temperance movement gained momentum in the late 1910s.59 By 1921,
Congress had passed and state legislatures had ratiﬁed the Eighteenth Amendment.60
Although criticized by some individuals, the temperance movement continued to

55

The Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699 (codiﬁed at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1890)). “An act divesting
intoxicating liquor of its interstate characteristics in certain cases.” Id. The purpose of the WebbKenyon Act was to allow states to regulate alcohol as they see ﬁt so long as those regulations do not
discriminate against interstate commerce. Id.
56

Id.

57

See James Clark Distilling Co. v. W. Md. Ry. Co., 242 U.S. 311, 324 (1917). “[The] purpose
[of the Wilson Act] was to prevent the immunity characteristic of interstate commerce from being
used to permit the receipt of liquor though such commerce in states contrary to their laws, and thus
in effect afford a means by subterfuge and indirection to set such laws at naught.” Id.
58

Id.

59

See RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT: TEMPERANCE, REFORM, LEGAL
CULTURE, AND THE POLITY, 1880–1920, 19 (Thomas A. Green & Hendrick Hartogs eds., 1995).
A radical temperance ideology with its allied mosaic legal culture predominated
within the temperance crusade in the last two decades of the century. The drys’
ideology and legal notions made it difﬁcult for them to achieve much success in the
American polity dominated by formal and informal rules administered by political
parties and courts. Yet the popularity of temperance allowed drys to establish beachhead prohibition states. The liquor industry, after failing to block the adoption of
prohibition in these states, challenged the policy in the federal courts. These legal
confrontations set the parameters for the next three decades of liquor law struggles.
Id.
60

U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933). The text of the Eighteenth Amendment reads:
Section 1. After one year from the ratiﬁcation of this article the manufacture, sale,
or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the
exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction
thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratiﬁed as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided
in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to
the States by the Congress.

Id.
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gain the approval of the masses.61 From 1921 to 1933, Congress prohibited all
production, transportation, and sale of alcohol.62
By 1933, the temperance movement faltered.63 What had once been called
“the noble experiment” had failed.64 In its stead remained a charge to repeal the
Eighteenth Amendment.65 The introduction of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment into
Congress and its subsequent ratiﬁcation by state conventions ended prohibition.66
In 1933, the mass production and sale of alcohol resumed.67 With production
also came the return of the controversy over states’ rights and the regulation of
alcohol that dominated the judicial landscape prior to prohibition.68
This controversy centered on the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment’s similar language
to the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913.69 In fact, the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment codiﬁes
61
ALBERT EINSTEIN, MY FIRST IMPRESSION OF
OPINIONS 3-7 (Random House, New York, 1954).

THE

U.S.A. (1921). reprinted in IDEAS

AND

The prestige of government has undoubtedly been lowered considerably by the
prohibition law. For nothing is more destructive of respect for the government and
the law of the land than passing laws which cannot be enforced. It is an open secret
that the dangerous increase of crime in this country is closely connected with this.
Id.
62

See Hamm, supra note 59, at 19–21 (explaining the background of prohibition and legislative
history leading up to the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment). Interestingly, the Eighteenth
Amendment did not prohibit the production and sale of sacramental wine. See DOBYNS, F., THE
AMAZING STORY OF REPEAL, AN EXPOSE OF THE POWER OF PROPAGANDA 297 (1940). During the
prohibition years, the production and sale of sacramental wine increased dramatically perhaps saving
what remained of an already tattered wine industry. See id. The exception for sacramental wine from
protection under the Volstead Act invited abuse. See id. In 1925, the Department of Research and
Education of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ reported that:
The withdrawal of wine on permit from bonded warehouses for sacramental purposes
amounted in round ﬁgures to 2,139,000 gallons in the ﬁscal year 1922; 2,503,500
gallons in 1923; and 2,944,700 gallons in 1924. There is no way of knowing what
the legitimate consumption of fermented sacramental wine is but it is clear that the
legitimate demand does not increase 800,000 gallons in two years.
Id.
GUILLAUME FOURNIER, FROM ALCOHOL PROHIBITION TO REGULATION 5 (2002), http://www.
senliscouncil.net/documents/from_alcohol_prohibition_to_regulation (last visited October 21,
2007).
63

See HERBERT HOOVER, MEMOIRS
1920-1933 209 (1952).
64

OF

HERBERT HOOVER-THE CABINET

AND THE

PRESIDENCY:

65

Battipaglia v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 745 F.2d 166, 169 (1987). In Battipaglia, Judge
Friendly, writing for the majority of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, noted that “[t]he Twentyﬁrst Amendment was designed to end the noble experiment by which the federal government
endeavored to control the drinking habits of all citizens and place control of alcoholic beverages in
the states.” Id at 168-69. (citations omitted).
66

Fournier, supra note 63.

67

Id.

68

Id.

69

See 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 34 (1964); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2.
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the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act.70 With this similarity in mind, the Supreme
Court held that section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment “reserves to the states
power to impose burdens on interstate commerce in intoxicating liquor that,
absent the Amendment, would clearly be invalid under the Commerce Clause.”71
The Court even went so far as to say that section two “represents the only express
grant of power to the states, thereby creating a fundamental restructuring of the
constitutional scheme as it relates to one product-intoxicating liquors.”72
With the ability to regulate alcohol free from federal interference, many states
enacted a three-tier system of alcohol distribution.73 The three tiers are producers,
wholesalers, and retailers.74 The system purportedly aids in achieving the goals
of temperance by increasing prices, raising revenue by remittance of taxes, and
eliminating undesirable market inﬂuence from one level of the system over the
others.75 This is achieved by mandating that producers sell only to wholesalers,
wholesalers to retailers, and retailers to consumers.76 Finally, the three-tier system
requires that all alcoholic beverages be distributed through licensed entities to
ensure compliance with all state laws.77

70
Compare The Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. 699 (codiﬁed at 27 U.S.C. § 122 (1890)) (“The
shipment or transportation . . . in violation of any law of such State, Territory, or District of the
United States, or place noncontiguous to but subject to the jurisdiction thereof, is prohibited.”)
with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI § 2 (“The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.”).
71
Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 712 (1984) (holding that a state law banning
alcohol advertising did not directly relate to the core power of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment to
control whether to permit importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution
or to regulate the times, places and manner under which liquor may be imported and sold in the
state).
72

Castlewood Int’l Corp., 596 F.2d at 642. A few years prior to the decision in Castlewood,
the Court changed its position by holding that section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment is not
free from other aspects of the Constitution. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding that
section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment must be read in light of other constitutional provisions
including the ﬁrst amendment and the privileges and immunities clause).
73

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432
(1990) (holding that the three-tier system of alcohol distribution is “unquestionably legitimate.”)).
“Under the . . . [three-tier] regulatory system, there are three levels of liquor distributors: out-ofstate distillers/suppliers, state-licensed wholesalers, and state-licensed retailers. Distillers/suppliers
may sell to only licensed wholesalers[, and] . . . [l]icensed wholesalers, in turn, may sell to licensed
retailers, [and] other licensed wholesalers.” North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 428.
74

North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 428; see also 48 C.J.S Intoxicating Liquors §§ 297-298 (1955).

75

North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 431-32 (declaring that promoting temperance, ensuring orderly
market conditions, and raising revenue are all core concerns of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment).
76

48 C.J.S Intoxicating Liquors §§ 297-298 (1955).

77

Id.
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The Granholm Effect
In Granholm, the Court struck down state regulatory laws favoring in-state
producers over out-of-state producers.78 Since the Court’s decision, numerous
actions have been ﬁled in federal courts challenging state regulatory schemes in
the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision.79 Some of the post-Granholm cases
challenge clever attempts by legislatures to continue to discriminate against outof-state wine producers.80
Across the nation, wineries and consumers are challenging state laws that
restrict direct-to-consumer shipping.81 Common challenges in some of the
lawsuits are state code provisions which veil a protectionist economic barrier
behind production capacity caps.82 These provisions allow direct-to-consumer
shipping only to wineries producing less than a certain number of gallons per
year.83 Often these limits are set just above the largest in-state winery’s annual
production, but so low that many out-of-state wineries remain prohibited from
participating in the direct-to-consumer market.84 Even in the face of Granholm
and pending litigation across the nation, state legislatures have continued to enact
laws that, albeit increasingly crafty in design, continue to discriminate against

78

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493.

79

See, e.g., Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 1:06-11682 (D. Mass. ﬁled Sept. 18,
2006) (asserting that, in purpose and effect, the limits imposed by the capacity caps fall solely
upon out-of-state wineries, while in-state wineries continue to enjoy unfettered access to the
Massachusetts market); BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5,
2006) (charging discriminatory effects from the production volume cap for out-of-state wineries);
Beau v. Moore, No. 4:05-903 (E.D. Ark. ﬁled June 22, 2005) (alleging discrimination based on the
right of Arkansas wineries producing less than 250,000 gallons to sell directly to local consumers at
their premises while the plaintiff winery must sell to an Arkansas wholesaler or retailer).
80

E.g., BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006).

81

E.g., Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 1:06-11682 (D. Mass. ﬁled Sept. 18, 2006)
(asserting that, in purpose and effect, the limits imposed by the capacity caps fall solely upon outof-state wineries, while in-state wineries continue to enjoy unfettered access to the Massachusetts
market); BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006) (charging
discriminatory effects from the production volume cap for out-of-state wineries); Beau v. Moore,
No. 4:05-903 (E.D. Ark.. ﬁled June 22, 2005) (alleging discrimination based on the right of
Arkansas wineries producing less than 250,000 gallons to sell directly to local consumers at their
premises while the plaintiff winery must sell to an Arkansas wholesaler or retailer).
82

E.g., BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006).

E.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 19F (2006) (subjecting out-of-state wineries to a volume
cap and to ineligibility if they also sell through wholesalers, while affording in-state wineries access
to Massachusetts consumers).
83

84
See BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006)
(charging discriminatory effects from the production volume cap for out-of-state wineries); See also
infra note 99.
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interstate commerce.85 The recent legislative activity in Ohio and Wisconsin are
good examples of this trend.86
The trend of legislatures enacting facially neutral yet practically burdensome
regulations indicate that states have not heeded the Supreme Court’s decision in
Granholm.87 In fact, some states have chosen to act in rogue fashion with complete
disregard to Granholm.88 In these states, these protectionist state regulations affect
retailers as well as wineries.89 While some argue the retail-to-consumer market
85

See, e.g., H.B. 119, 127th Gen. Assem. § 4303.071(2) (Ohio 2007) (allowing wineries that
produce less than 150,000 gallons annually to hold a permit to ship wine of its own production to
resident consumers who have a household limit of twenty-four cases annually from all wineries);
S.B. 40 §125.535, 2007-2008 Leg., (Wis. 2007) (replacing Wisconsin’s reciprocal law with a Direct
Shipper’s Permit allowing shipment of up to twenty-seven liters per year directly to individual
consumers subject to a twenty-seven liter annual limit on direct shipment purchases from all
wineries).
86
H.B. 119, 127th Gen. Assem. § 4303.071(2) (Ohio 2007). In Ohio, the General Assembly
recently passed legislation that requires a direct shipping permit for wineries producing less than
150,000 gallons per year. Id. In addition to the production capacity restriction, the Ohio law also
includes a customer volume limit of twenty-four cases per year. Id. This purchase limit applies to
“family households,” a term which remains undeﬁned by the Ohio Legislature. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 4303.232 (2006). In Wisconsin, an anti-commerce direct shipping provision was
entered into the Biennial Budget Bill. S. B. 40 §125.535, 2007-2008 Leg., (Wis. 2007). If passed,
the new law would remove reciprocal language from the current Wisconsin laws. See WIS. STAT. §
139.035 (2006). It would also limit direct shipments of wine to twenty-seven liters per year for all
wineries. S.B. 40, 2007-2008 Leg., (Wis. 2007). This type of provision burdens producers to do
the impossible and track all shipments of wine from across the nation to each individual consumer.
See generally News, Free The Grapes!, http://www.freethegrapes.org/news.html#FTGUpdates
(last visited on August 19, 2007). The trend of including provisions like this into direct shipping
legislation seems to be evenhanded at ﬁrst glance since they apply to both in-state and out-of-state
interests. Id. However, upon further examination, it is apparent that the bill is really meant as a
means of protecting the interests of wholesalers who successfully lobby the legislature for preferential
treatment. See, e.g., Jason Stein, Proposed Law Alarms Wisconsin Vintners, WISCONSIN STATE JOURNAL,
June 29, 2007, at A1. In effect, the proposed amendment removes the ability of small in-state
wineries to self-distribute to retailers and restaurants. Id. The removal of self-distribution will cause
wineries to increase prices of products in order to retain some portion of their proﬁt margin. Id.
87
See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 4-205.04(c) (2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 19F (2006). See
also Complaint 2, Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 1:06-11682 (D. Mass. ﬁled Sept. 18,
2006) (asserting that, in purpose and effect, the limits imposed by the capacity caps fall solely upon
out-of-state wineries, while in-state wineries continue to enjoy unfettered access to the Massachusetts
market); BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006) (charging
discriminatory effects from the production volume cap for out-of-state wineries).
88
Illinois Lawmakers Invite Lawsuit by Disregarding Supreme Court Ruling with Passage of HB
429 at 1, http://chicagoist.com/attachments/chicagoist_chuck/HB%20429%20Response%20by%
20SWRA.pdf (last visited on October 17, 2007).
89
See Judge Kenneth Starr, Introduction, http://www.specialtywineretailers.org/press-release/
SWRA_Constituticacy_Letter.pdf (last visited on September 7, 2007). See also Arnold’s Wine’s,
Inc. v. Boyle, No. 06-3357, slip op. at 2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2007) (holding that New York laws
requiring all liquor sold, delivered, shipped, or transported to a New York consumer must ﬁrst pass
through an entity licensed by the state of New York (i.e. the three-tier system) are not subject to
review under the Commerce Clause because the Supreme Court held in Granholm that the threetier system is unquestionably legitimate).
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is distinguishable from the winery-to-consumer market and thus not controlled
by Granholm, they are mistaken.90 Placing protectionist restrictions on retailers
is the same sort of limitation on sale and delivery that Granholm forbids.91 The
effects of these laws are similar to those ruled unconstitutional by the Court.92
They prohibit out-of-state retailers from selling their products while allowing
in-state retailers to continue to enjoy the proﬁts of selling and delivering directly
to consumers.93 Yet states continue to pass laws that violate the Commerce Clause
even when those laws are analogous to laws currently being challenged.94 The
continued passage of laws like these illustrates the need for the Court to clarify
the limits of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment in relation to the negative implications
of the Commerce Clause.95

Summary
The history of alcohol regulation in the United States has evolved from
treating alcohol as a normal article of commerce to an illicit substance subject
to criminal penalties for possession.96 Post prohibition, the regulatory pendulum
is swinging, once again, in the pro-commerce direction.97 Today, e-commerce
affords consumers the ability to purchase almost anything for home delivery.98
90
Starr, supra note 89. “State laws discriminating against out-of-state retailers raise the
same policy and constitutional concerns as state laws discriminating against out-of-state wineries.”
Id. at 2.
91

Id.

92

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 460 (2005) (stating that laws that mandate differential treatment
of in-state and out-of-state economic interest that beneﬁts the former and burdens the latter
discriminate against interstate commerce and face a virtually per se rule of invalidity).
93

Id. at 468-70.

Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 138, § 19F (2006) (permitting only wineries producing
less than thirty-thousand gallons of wine per year) with OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4303.232(2)
(permitting only wineries producing less than one-hundred-ﬁfty-thousand gallons of wine per year);
see also Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 1:06-11682 (D. Mass. ﬁled Sept. 18, 2006)
(asserting that, in purpose and effect, the limits imposed by the capacity caps fall solely upon outof-state wineries, while in-state wineries continue to enjoy unfettered access to the Massachusetts
market).
94

95

See Starr, supra note 89, at 1; Granholm 544 U.S. at 493.

96

See Castlewood Int’l Corp., 596 F.2d at 642 (“Since the founding of our Republic, power over
regulation of liquor has ebbed and ﬂowed between the federal government and the states”); William
Glunz, Granholm v. Heald: The Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment Takes Another Hit—Where Do States Go
From Here?, 40 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 651, 653–62 (2007) (discussing the history and trends of
alcohol regulations).
97
Compare Castlewood Int’l Corp., 596 F.2d at 642 (“Since the founding of our Republic, power
over regulation of liquor has ebbed and ﬂowed between the federal government and the states”) with
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 484-85 (“The [Twenty-ﬁrst] Amendment did not give States authority to
pass non-uniform laws in order to discriminate against out-of-state goods, a privilege they had not
enjoyed at any earlier time.”).

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 551(8th ed. 2004). “E-commerce: The practice of buying and
selling goods and services through online consumer services on the Internet.” Id.
98
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State legislatures continue to address laws which violate Granholm and litigation
in the lower courts is clarifying its outer limits.99 Over time, the Court’s traditional
Commerce Clause analysis, combined with growing pressure from free-market
economists, could cause the Court to clarify that retail-to-consumer laws must
be evenhanded and reverse its position towards the three-tier system as being
“unquestionably legitimate.”100

PRINCIPAL CASE
In the past several years, there have been signiﬁcant challenges to state
regulations that afford privileges to in-state producers and retailers that are not also
extended to their out-of-state counterparts.101 The two most signiﬁcant of these
challenges occurred in Michigan and New York in 2003 and 2004 respectively.102
These cases were consolidated on appeal to United States Supreme Court.103

99
E.g., Family Winemakers of Cal. v. Jenkins, No. 1:06-11682 (D. Mass. ﬁled Sept. 18, 2006)
(asserting that, in purpose and effect, the limits imposed by the capacity caps fall solely upon outof-state wineries, while in-state wineries continue to enjoy unfettered access to the Massachusetts
market); BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006) (charging
discriminatory effects from the production volume cap for out-of-state wineries); Beau v. Moore,
No. 4:05-903 (E.D. Ark. ﬁled June 22, 2005) (alleging discrimination based on the right of Arkansas
wineries producing less than 250,000 gallons to sell directly to local consumers at their premises
while the plaintiff winery must sell to an Arkansas wholesaler or retailer).
100
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978); Possible Anti-competitive Barriers to Ecommerce: Wine, A Report from the Staff of the Federal Trade Commission, July 2003, http://www.ftc.
gov/os/2003/07/winereport2.pdf (last visited September 7, 2007) [hereinafter FTC Report].
101
See Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 468 (2005); BlackStar Farms, LLC v. Morrison,
No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006) (charging discriminatory effects from the production
volume cap for out-of-state wineries). The Arizona law affords direct-to-consumer shipping
privileges to wineries producing less than 25,000 gallons per calendar year. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4-205.04(c) (2006). Interestingly, the aggregate of wine produced by all wineries in Arizona was just
32,031 gallons from July of 2005 to June of 2006. US Wine Production, http://www.wineamerica.org/
newsroom/wine%20data%20center/Production%20of%20Wine%207-05%20to%206-06.pdf
(last visited August 18, 2007). Also, the largest producing winery in Arizona, Kokopelli Winery,
produces approximately 25,000 gallons per year. Id. In contrast, California, which is responsible for
eighty percent of all wine produced in the country, produced 713,540,740 gallons in the same time
frame. Id. A very small number of California wineries produce amounts less than the limits imposed
by the Arizona law. Id. Thus, the Arizona law, while facially neutral, in practical effects, allows
in-state producers to ship their wines directly to consumers and prohibits out-of-state producers the
same privilege, a clear cut case of discrimination against interstate commerce. BlackStar Farms, LLC
v. Morrison, No. 2:05-02620 (D. Ariz. ﬁled Oct. 5, 2006) (charging discriminatory effects from the
production volume cap for out-of-state wineries).
102
Heald v. Engler, 342 F.3d 517, 525 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment
does not allow a state to discriminate against out-of-state producers in violation of the Commerce
Clause.); Swedenburg v. Kelly, 358 F.3d 223, 238 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that under section two
of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment, states are free to regulate alcohol in a way that discriminates against
interstate commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause).
103

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 471 (2005). Justice Kennedy delivered the opinion
of the Court in which Justice Scalia, Justice Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer joined.
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In Granholm, the plaintiffs argued that the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment must be
read in light of other constitutional provisions.104 In particular, the plaintiffs asserted
that the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment does not abrogate the states’ accountability to
the dormant Commerce Clause’s anti-discrimination principle.105 Moreover, they
argued that when a state chooses to regulate alcohol, it must do so on evenhanded
terms for both in-state and out-of-state interests.106
The States argued the opposite.107 The States asserted that the Twenty-ﬁrst
Amendment of the Constitution removes any Commerce Clause concerns from
state alcohol regulations.108 They also contended that section two of the Twentyﬁrst Amendment gives the states power to regulate the direct shipment of wine on
terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers.109
Relying on the California Wine Institute’s amicus curiae brief, the Supreme
Court held that both New York and Michigan’s regulatory goals could be achieved
by less restrictive alternatives.110 The Wine Institute inventoried state laws that
allow out-of-state wineries to ship directly to consumers and maintain the
temperance goals of the states.111 These examples, the Wine Institute argued, prove

Justice Stevens ﬁled a dissenting opinion in which Justice O’Connor joined. Justice Thomas ﬁled a
dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and Justice O’Connor joined.
Id.
104

Pet. for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 03-1120)
(“[T]he [Twenty-ﬁrst] Amendment was not designed to repeal, but only to modify, the precious
liberties protected by the Commerce Clause.”); Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470. “Plaintiffs contend . . .
that Michigan’s direct-shipment laws discriminate . . . against interstate commerce in violation of
the Commerce Clause.” Id.
105

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 470.

106

Id.

107

Id.

108

Id. at 476. “The two States, however, contend their statutes are saved by [section] 2 of
the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment, [however], . . . section 2 does not allow States to regulate the direct
shipment of wine on terms that discriminate in favor of in-state producers.” Id.
109

Id.

110

Brief of Amicus Curiae Wine Institute in Support of Resp’t at 1, 5, Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 03-1120). The Wine Institute is a pro-commerce advocacy group. Id. at 1.
Its membership of California wineries produce greater than eighty percent of all wine manufactured
in the U.S. Id.
111
Id. at 5. “In fact, 26 states now allow and regulate interstate direct shipments of wine
to consumers.” Id. For example, at the time of submission of the Amicus Curiae Brief, “Alaska,
Arizona, California . . . Wisconsin, West Virginia, and Wyoming” all allowed limited direct-toconsumer shipping of wine. Id. at n.3.
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that allowing in-state producers to ship directly-to-consumers while prohibiting
the same for out-of-state producers is merely a veil to protect in-state interests.112
The Supreme Court agreed.113

Majority Opinion
Justice Kennedy authored the majority opinion in Granholm v. Heald.114
Justices Stevens and Thomas each wrote separate dissenting opinions.115 In
Granholm, the Supreme Court engaged in a two-prong analysis.116 Under the
ﬁrst prong, the Court determined whether the state laws in question violated
the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.117 If the Court found
a violation committed by the State then the Court, under the second prong,
determined whether those laws “advance[d] a legitimate local purpose that [could
not] be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”118
Under the ﬁrst prong, the Court held that Michigan’s law prohibiting direct
shipments of wine by out-of-state wineries, but explicitly allowing in-state wineries
direct shipping privileges was obvious discrimination.119 Conversely, the Court

112
Id. Michigan’s laws prohibited direct-to consumer shipping by out-of-state producers while
allowing intrastate shipments. Id. at 13. In contrast, reasonable alternatives exist, as indicated from
the states that “allow and regulate direct shipment without discriminating against out-of-state
wineries.” Id. For example, states can adopt reporting requirements to assist in enforcement. Id. at
11. In Wyoming, out-of-state shippers must maintain and submit shipping records upon request.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204(d)(vi) (2006). They can also subject out-of-state shippers who violate
state laws regulating direct shipments to ﬁnes. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Wine Institute, supra
note 110, at 10. In New Hampshire, direct shipping permit holders who ship liquor, wine, or beer
to a person under twenty-one years of age are subject to a class B felony and permanent permit
revocation. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 178.27(vii) (2006). Finally, statutes can provide that licensed
out-of-state shippers are deemed to have consented to the State’s jurisdiction. See Brief of Amicus
Curiae Wine Institute, supra note 110, at 9. In South Carolina, an out-of-state shipper licensee shall
be deemed to have consented to the jurisdiction of the courts. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 61-4-747(c)(6)
(2006).
113
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 491 (“States provide little concrete evidence for the sweeping
assertion that they cannot police direct shipments by out-of-state wineries. Our Commerce Clause
cases demand more than mere speculation to support discrimination against out-of-state goods.”).
114

See generally Granholm, 544 U.S. 460 (2005).

115

Id. at 493 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

116

Id. at 472-76, 489-93.

117

Id.

118

Id. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 278 (1988)).

119

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 474. “The discriminatory character of the Michigan system
is obvious. Michigan allows in-state wineries to ship directly-to-consumers, subject only to a
licensing requirement. Out-of-state wineries, whether licensed or not, face a complete ban on direct
shipment.” Id. at 474-75.
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found that New York’s law was less openly restrictive.120 New York permitted
in-state wineries to direct ship to consumers whereas out-of-state wineries were
permitted to ship direct-to-consumers only if they established a branch ofﬁce
and/or warehouse in-state.121 Looking to precedent, the Court noted that it had
“viewed with particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operation
to be performed in the home state that could more efﬁciently be performed
elsewhere.”122 Thus, both New York and Michigan’s laws failed under the ﬁrst
prong of the Court’s analysis.123
Next, under the second prong, the Court examined the two state laws to
determine if they advanced a legitimate local purpose that could not be adequately
served by reasonable non-discriminatory alternatives.124 The States offered two
reasons for restricting direct-to-consumer shipments of wine: “[K]eeping alcohol
out of the hands of minors and facilitating tax collection.”125 The Court rejected
each of these arguments, ﬁnding there were less discriminatory means the states
could employ to protect such interests.126 Thus, the Court ruled that the Michigan
and New York laws were unconstitutional and that the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment
does not allow a State to discriminate against out-of-state producers of wine
in violation of the Commerce Clause.127 Nevertheless, the Court was careful
to mention that “states [retain] broad power to regulate liquor under section
two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment.”128 This power, however, “does not allow
states to ban, or severely limit, the direct shipment of out-of-state wine while
simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by in-state producers.”129

120
Id. at 475 (quoting Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963)).
“[I]n-state presence requirement[s] run . . . contrary to our admonition that States cannot require
an out-of-state ﬁrm to become a resident in order to compete on equal terms.” Id.
121

Id. at 476.

122

Id. at 475 (quoting Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970)).

123

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 476. “State laws that discriminate against interstate commerce face
a virtually per se rule of invalidity. The Michigan and New York laws by their own terms violate this
proscription.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
124

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (quoting New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269,
278 (1988)).
125

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.

126

Id. at 492. Justice Kennedy stated the potential loss of federal distilling permits as
punishment for noncompliance of state laws combined with state licensing requirements adequately
protect states from lost tax revenue. Id. Further, he noted that states have not shown that tax evasion
and selling alcohol to minors by out-of-state wineries poses such a unique threat that it justiﬁes
discrimination. Id
127

Id. at 493.

128

Id.

129

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493.
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Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy gave the three-tier system a cursory
analysis in Granholm.130 But, he mentioned it only to calm the concern the
states expressed in their briefs that to hold direct shipment laws unconstitutional
would logically result in ﬁnding the entire three-tier system unconstitutional.131
Justice Kennedy, in dictum, stated this result did not “follow from [the Court’s]
holding.”132 The Court reasoned that the “Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment grants states
virtually complete control over whether to permit importation or sale of liquor
and how to structure the liquor distribution system.”133 Moreover, the Court
has “previously recognized that the three-tier system itself is unquestionably
legitimate.”134

Justice Stevens, with whom Justice O’Connor Joined, Dissenting
Granholm was decided by a narrow ﬁve-to-four vote.135 Two of the four
dissenters chose to write their own opinions.136 Justice Stevens wrote that the
majority was acting contrary to the intent of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment.137 He
argued that the Court should defer to justices like himself who were alive at the
time of ratiﬁcation and had lived through the beginning and end of prohibition.138
Justice Stevens would have held that “intoxicating liquors” for “delivery or use
130
Id. at 489-90. See also North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 428 (1990) (“Under
the . . . [three-tier] regulatory system, there are three levels of liquor distributors: out-of-state
distillers/suppliers, state-licensed wholesalers, and state-licensed retailers. Distillers/suppliers may
sell to only licensed wholesalers[, and] . . . [l]icensed wholesalers, in turn, may sell to licensed
retailers, [and] other licensed wholesalers.”).
131

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488-89.
The States argue that any decision invalidating their direct-shipment laws would
call into question the constitutionality of the three-tier system. The Twenty-ﬁrst
Amendment grants States virtually complete control over whether to permit
importation or sale of liquor and how to structure the liquor distribution system.
States may . . . assume direct control of liquor distribution through state-run outlets
or funnel sales through the three-tier system. We have previously held that the threetier system itself is unquestionably legitimate.

Id. (citations and quotations omitted).
132

Id. at 488.

133

Id.

134

Id. (citing North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423, 432 (1990)).

135

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 463.

136

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 463.

137

Granholm v. Heald, 540 U.S. 460, 495 n.2 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting). “According to
Justice Black, who participated in the passage of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment in the Senate, [section]
2 was intended to return ‘absolute control’ of liquor trafﬁc to the States, free of all restrictions which
the Commerce Clause might before that time have imposed.” Id. (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon
Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 338 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting)).
138

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 495 (Stevens, J., dissenting). “The views of judges who lived through
the debates that led to the ratiﬁcation of those Amendments are entitled to special deference.” Id.
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
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therein” are exempt from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny.139 He reasoned
that since “the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment is the only amendment to have been
passed by the people in state conventions, rather than by state legislatures, provides
further reason to give its terms their ordinary meaning.”140

Justice Thomas, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Stevens, and
Justice O’Connor Joined, Dissenting
Justice Thomas asserted that the dormant Commerce Clause does not
invalidate the state laws in question.141 He argued the text of the Twenty-ﬁrst
Amendment combined with legislative history and text of the Webb-Kenyon
Act clearly indicated that states are free to regulate alcohol as they choose.142
Moreover, he would have held that states have such broad authority under the
Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment that they may pass laws regulating alcohol in violation
of nondiscrimination principles of the dormant Commerce Clause.143

Summary
In Granholm, the Supreme Court ruled on the issue of whether states may
regulate alcohol free from Commerce Clause principles.144 The Court clariﬁed
that while states retain broad authority to regulate alcohol within their borders,
they must do so in accordance with the negative implications of the Commerce
Clause.145 Thus, if a state chooses to allow intrastate direct-to-consumer shipments

139

Id. at 496 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

140

Id. at 497 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

141

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 497 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting).

142

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas relied on the decision in State Board of
Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Market, the language of the Webb-Kenyon Act, and the Twenty-ﬁrst
Amendment in support of his reasoning. State Bd. of Equalization of Cal. v. Young’s Mkt. Co., 299
U.S. 59 (1936); 37 Stat. 699 (codiﬁed at 27 U.S.C. § 122); U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
143

Granholm. 544 U.S. at 498 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

144

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493.
States have broad power to regulate liquor under § 2 of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment.
This power, however, does not allow States to ban, or severely limit, the direct
shipment of out-of-state wine while simultaneously authorizing direct shipment by
instate producers. If a State chooses to allow direct shipment of wine, it must do so
on evenhanded terms.

Id. See also The National Pulse, States Mull the Wine Decision, Consumers Savor High Court’s
Pleasing Delivery, But Some Are Left With a Bitter Aftertaste, Molly McDonough, 4 No. 20 A.B.A
J. E-REPORT 2, 3 (May 20, 2005). “Merely the effort to protect entrenched special interest is not
going to be [a] good enough reason to allow these regulations to stand.” Id. “As for the Twentyﬁrst Amendment analysis, Zywicki says the majority ‘got it exactly right’” (quoting Professor Todd
Zywicki, George Mason University School of Law). Id.
145

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493.
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of wine, it also must allow interstate direct-to-consumer shipments of wine or
ﬁnd its regulations invalid.146

ANALYSIS
In Granholm v. Heald, the United States Supreme Court clariﬁed that the
Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment does not allow states to regulate alcohol in violation of the
Commerce Clause’s nondiscrimination principle.147 The Court’s ruling indicates a
return to its pre-Eighteenth Amendment jurisprudence.148 This decision reafﬁrms
the proposition that even alcohol regulations must be drafted in compliance with
other provisions of the United States Constitution.149 While the Court correctly
ruled on the direct-to-consumer wine shipping issue, its collateral approval of
the three-tier system as “unquestionably legitimate” was cursorily inadequate
and contradictory to its main holding.150 Furthermore, the Granholm framework
146

Id.

147

Id.

148

Compare Vance v. W. A. Vandercook Co., 170 U.S. 438 (1898) (holding that a state could
not stop the interstate shipment of liquor for personal use) with Granholm, 544 U.S. 460 (2005)
(holding the section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment does allow states to allow in-state wineries
to ship directly-to-consumers for personal consumption while simultaneously prohibiting the same
privilege to out-of-state interests); see also Marcia Rablon, The Prohibition Hangover: Why are we Still
Feeling the Effects of Prohibition, 13 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L 552, 582 (explaining the Court treated
direct-shipping regulations, prior to passage of the Eighteenth Amendment, as if it were a normal
article of interstate commerce).
149

See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976) (holding state laws that regulate alcohol must
accord with other provisions of the U.S. Constitution and that the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment’s grant
of authority does not abrogate this requirement); Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S. 150
(1940) (holding the broad police power of the states over liquor trafﬁc does not justify the disregard
of constitutional guarantees or authorize the imposition of conditions requiring the relinquishment
of constitutional rights).
150

Reply Brief of Petitioner at 7-8, Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (No. 03-1120).
As noted in greater detail below, infra note 152 and accompanying text, Michigan worried in its
reply brief that to hold its direct-to-consumer wine shipping laws unconstitutional would also call
into question the legitimacy of the three-tier system itself. Id. However, the majority disagreed.
Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488. It found the state’s conclusion does not follow from the Court’s holding
in Granholm. Id. Furthermore, the Court held it had “previously recognized that the three-tier
system is ‘unquestionably legitimate’ . . . [and that] [s]tate policies are protected under the Twentyﬁrst Amendment when they treat liquor produced out-of-state the same as its domestic equivalent.”
Id. at 489. See also Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1252 (W.D. Wash.)
(2005) (holding that state laws that allow in-state wineries to “self-distribute” to retailers while
simultaneously prohibiting out-of-state wineries to “self distribute” violates the negative implication
of the Commerce Clause). In Costco, the United States District Court for Washington evaluated
whether certain aspects of Washington State’s three-tier system were valid. Id. Applying the Granholm
framework, the court found that regulatory scheme in Washington, which allows in-state wineries
to self-distribute but requires out-of-state wineries to channel their wines through the three-tier
system was a violation of the Commerce Clause. Id. at 1256. Furthermore, the district court held
Washington does not achieve its goals of ensuring orderly distribution by prohibiting out-of-state
producers from self-distributing to in-state retailers. Id. at 1253. The district court noted these
objectives can “be achieved through the alternative of an evenhanded licensing requirement.” Id.
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implies that alcohol regulations which allow in-state retailers to ship directly-toconsumers and prohibit out-of-state retailers to ship directly-to-consumers are
invalid.151 With these results in mind, the Court must revisit these issues and
apply its analytical framework to condemn residual discriminatory state alcohol
regulations and clarify the acceptable role of the three-tier system in the twentyﬁrst century.152

Granholm’s Implications
Many states mandate that alcohol producers channel their products through
what is commonly known as the “three-tier system.”153 The three-tiers are
producers, distributors, and retailers.154 Under the three-tier system, a producer
must sell to a licensed in-state distributor who, in turn, must sell to a licensed
in-state retailer.155 States that mandate the three-tier system for all wines argue
the three-tiers facilitate temperance goals by increasing prices, raising revenue via
taxes, and restricting access to alcohol for minors.156 Moreover, some states allow
in-state retailers to ship direct-to-consumers and prohibit out-of-state retailers
from shipping direct-to-consumers.157 The factual similarities of the three-tier

at 1253. Thus, Costco represents a glimpse of how courts may deal with challenges to the three-tier
system. See also Starr, supra note 89, at 3.
151
See, e.g., Starr, supra note 89, at 3; Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1247,
1250 (W.D. Wash. 2005); Brooks v. Vassar, 462 F.3d 341, 352 (4th Cir. 2006).
152
Matthew B. Millis, Note, Let History Be Our Guide: Using Historical Analogies to Analyze
State Response to a Post-Granholm Era, 81 IND. L.J. 1097, 1098 (2006).

[S]tates will not simply abandon their discriminatory alcohol regulations without
a ﬁght. Likely, states will respond by redrafting facially discriminatory laws to be
facially neutral. These seemingly neutral laws will . . . perpetuate the discrimination
that the Supreme Court sought to prohibit in Granholm. The Court will then
be presented with a string of cases challenging the constitutionality of these new
statutes.
Id.
153

See 45 AM. JUR. 2D Intoxicating Liquors § 94 (1964).

154

See, e.g., David H. Smith, Consumer Protection or Veiled Protectionism? An Overview of Recent
Challenges to State Restrictions on E-Commerce, 15 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 359, 366 (2003).
155

Duncan Baird Douglass, Constitutional Crossroads: Reconciling the Twenty-First Amendment
and the Commerce Clause to Evaluate Regulation of Interstate Commerce in Alcoholic Beverages, 49
DUKE L.J. 1619, 1621 (2000).
156
See e.g., Beskind v. Easley, 325 F.3d 506, 516 (4th Cir. 2003). The court in Beskind¸ stated
that a number of valid state interests are served by North Carolina’s three-tier structure, including
regulating consumption of alcohol controlling distribution of alcohol and collecting taxes on
alcohol. Id.; See also North Dakota, 495 U.S. at 432. “In the interest of promoting temperance,
ensuring orderly market conditions, and raising revenue, the State has established a comprehensive
system for the distribution of liquor within its borders. That system is unquestionably legitimate.”
Beskind, 325 F.3d at 516.
157

See, e.g., 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-12 (2006).
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system and the retail-to-consumer market to those issues decided in Granholm
intuitively indicate that laws of this nature are as unconstitutional as those the
Granholm Court invalidated.158
Although the constitutionality of the three-tier system, as a whole, was not
directly at issue in Granholm, the Court gave it a cursory stamp of approval.159
Michigan, in its brief, worried that ﬁnding laws prohibiting direct-to-consumer
shipping unconstitutional in the face of the Commerce Clause would also result
in the three-tier system being found unconstitutional.160 More precisely, Michigan
argued:
[I]f [it] cannot draw rational distinctions between out-of-state
and in-state suppliers of alcoholic beverages, there is no obvious
reason why it would not be required to allow any out-of-state
wholesalers to ship wine . . . to in-state retailers and out-of-state
retailers to ship . . . directly to consumers. [To do so] would
largely mean the end of the three-tier system of regulation that
this Court has called ‘unquestionably legitimate.’ This case is
. . . about the viability of the entire system of alcohol regulation
that the states have relied upon for seventy years.161
The States’ concern is not misplaced.162 The prediction about retailers seeking
to participate on equal terms in the direct-to-consumer market has come true.163
For example, recent legislation in Illinois illustrates that some states continue
to craft laws which disregard Granholm.164 In these states, the effects of these

158

See Starr, supra note 89.

159

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 488-89.

160

Reply Brief of Petitioner, at 7-8 n.6.

161

Id. at 2 (internal citations omitted).

162

Michael A. Pasahow, Note, Granholm v. Heald: Shifting the Boundaries of Cal. Reciprocal
Wine Shipping Laws, 21 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 569, 583-84 (2006).
California’s continued involvement in the internet wine market will boost the
market’s size and visibility and push states currently banning direct retail shipments
to rethink their restrictions as consumers and voters get information about the greater
value and range of choices available online. The continued growth of an interstate,
internet-based retail wine industry to compete with the three-tier system will further
decrease the political and economic clout of the wholesalers and will continue to put
pressure on states to streamline their traditional distribution channels, leading to
greater efﬁciency and customer savings in the longer term.
Id.
163

See generally Specialty Wines Retailer Association, http://www.specialtywineretailers.org/ (last
visited on October 1, 2007).
Compare 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-12 (2006) with H.B. 429, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2007). The newly amended law was recently signed by the governor and is scheduled to become
effective on June 1, 2008. Id.
164
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protectionist state regulations have not been felt by wineries alone.165 Retailers
have also fallen victim to the direct shipping trade war.166 In Illinois, Governor
Rod Blagojevich signed the recently passed House Bill 429 to become effective on
June 1, 2008. 167 House Bill 429 removes reciprocal language that allows out-ofstate wineries to ship directly to Illinois consumers free from taxes and reporting
so long as Illinois wineries are able to enjoy the same privileges in that state.168
House Bill 429 creates a limited direct shipping permit system in place of the
old law.169 The bill also removes direct-to-consumer shipping privileges by outof-state retailers, a privilege they have enjoyed since 1980.170 However, in-state
retailers continue to enjoy the ability to ship direct.171

Granholm, Out-of-State Retailers, and the Three-Tier System
If Granholm is held to posit an analytical framework, it is as follows: First,
the Court must determine whether a state law discriminates against interstate
commerce.172 If the law does discriminate against interstate commerce, then the
Court determines whether there are less discriminatory alternatives that might
be employed to achieve the stated purpose of those laws.173 If less burdensome
alternatives exist, then the laws in question are struck down.174 However, if no less
restrictive alternatives exists then the law is saved, even in face of the Commerce
Clause’s nondiscrimination principles.175

165

See generally Starr, supra note 89.

166

Id.

167

H.B. 429, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007).

168

Id.

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Id. When House Bill 429 takes affect it will replace Illinois’s current relevant laws. In
particular, 235 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-12(d) (2006) will remove the retailer-to-consumer shipping
privilege and replace it with:
(d) A retailer license shall allow the licensee to sell and offer for sale at retail, only
in the premises speciﬁed in the license, alcohol liquor for use or consumption, but
not for resale in any form. Nothing in the Amendatory Act of the 95th General
Assembly shall deny, limit, remove, or restrict the ability of a holder of a retailer’s
license to transfer, deliver, or ship alcoholic liquor to the purchaser for use or consumption
subject to any applicable local law or ordinance.
Id. (emphasis added). This language is pertinent because only in-state retailers can qualify for a retail
license in Illinois.
172

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472.

173

Id. at 492.

174

Id.

175

See id.; See also Brooks v. Vassar; Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Hoen, 407 F. Supp. 2d 1247,
1250 (W.D. Wash.) (2005).
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Applying the Court’s analytical framework from Granholm to the retailer-toconsumer market, using Illinois law as an example leads to the conclusion that
laws prohibiting out-of-sate retailers from shipping directly-to-consumers, while
simultaneously allowing the same to in-state retailers, impermissibly burdens
interstate commerce.176 Similarly, while the Court has indicated that the three-tier
system is a valid exercise of state authority, the rule from Granholm illuminates
a contradiction in the Court’s reasoning.177 Allowing in-state wholesalers to
participate in the distribution of wine while out-of-state wholesalers are completely
prohibited from doing so impermissibly burdens interstate commerce under the
Granholm holding.178 Additionally, there are less burdensome alternatives to the
system that meet the States’ regulatory goals.179

Out-of-State Retailers
Under the ﬁrst prong of the Granholm analysis, laws that “mandate differential
treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that beneﬁt the former
and burden the latter” are virtually per se invalid.180 The new Illinois law overtly
discriminates against interstate commerce because it creates a regulatory scheme
that is openly discriminatory.181 As such, the retailer aspect of Illinois’s direct
shipping laws, if challenged, should fail the ﬁrst prong of the Granholm analytical
framework.182 Wholesalers maintain that federally permitted wineries are subject
to steep penalties should they violate the law, and thus are distinguishable from
176
See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489 (stating that although the three-tier system is legitimate,
state regulations are only protected by the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment when they treat in-state and
out-of-state interests evenhandedly); See also Starr, supra note 89, at 3.
177

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.

See id.; See also Donna Walter, Missouri Laws on Wine Shipping Challenged, SAINT LOUIS
DAILY RECORD, Nov. 29, 2006.
178

[A]lthough closing down the market in wine sounds a lot like going back to
the 1950s, that’s where states are going, at least in the short run, because if the
market is closed down, then all the wine goes back to being handled by [wholesale
distributors], and they get to mark it up and make a nice proﬁt and continue to
make money off of it.
Id.
179

See FTC Report, supra note 100, at 27.

180

Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality of Ore.,
511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994)).
181

Compare H.B. 429, 95th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2007) (allowing direct-to-consumer
shipments by in-state retailers while simultaneously prohibiting the same privilege from out-of-state
retailers) with MICH. COMP. LAWS § 436.1113(9) (allowing in-state wineries eligibility for a “wine
maker” license that allow direct-to-consumer shipping prohibiting the same privilege to out-ofstate wineries). The Michigan law was found to be an example of overt discrimination of the kind
strictly forbidden by the dormant Commerce Clause. See also Granholm, 544 U.S. at 473 (“The
discriminatory character of the Michigan system is obvious.”).
182

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 493 (holding laws that discriminatorily beneﬁt in-state economic
interests and burden similar out-of-state interests face a virtually per se rule of invalidity).
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retailers and not subject to the Granholm rule.183 However, this notion fails to
take into account the fact that in those states that allow retailer-to-consumer
shipping, retailers, like their winery counterparts, must agree to the jurisdiction
and restrictions of the state as a condition of obtaining a permit.184
For example, in Wyoming, both in-state and out-of-state retailers have the
ability to ship up to two cases of wine per year directly to consumers as long as they
obtain a permit and remit copies of invoices of all wine shipped throughout the
state.185 Wyoming is a good example of a reasonable alternative regulatory scheme
which treats both in-state and out-of-state retailers equally and in compliance
with the Commerce Clause.186 Therefore, as was the case with Michigan’s and
183

See Trial Brief of Def., Costco v. Hoen, No. 04-0360 at 39 (2006) (stating that state laws
that allow in-state wineries to “self-distribute” to retailers while simultaneously prohibiting out-ofstate wineries to “self distribute” does not violate the Granholm decision because, in Granholm, the
Court’s holding was narrowly tailored only to apply to the winery-to-consumer factual scenario).
184
See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204(d)(vii) (2006). “Any out-of-state shippers licensed pursuant
to this section shall: . . . (vii) Be deemed to have consented to the personal jurisdiction of the liquor
division or any other state agency and the courts of this state concerning enforcement of this section
and any related laws, rules or regulations.” Id;. See also Starr, supra note 89, at 5.
185

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204 (2006). The relevant statutory language in Wyoming states:
(a) Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, any person currently
licensed in its state of domicile as an alcoholic liquor or malt beverage manufacturer,
importer, wholesaler or retailer who obtains an out-of-state shipper’s license, as
provided in this section, may ship no more than a total of eighteen (18) liters of
manufactured wine directly to any one (1) household in this state in any twelve (12)
month period.
(b) Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, any person currently
licensed in its state of domicile as an alcoholic liquor or malt beverage manufacturer,
importer, wholesaler or retailer who obtains an out-of-state shipper’s license, as
provided in this section, may ship to any Wyoming retail establishment which holds
a liquor license in this state any manufactured wine which is not listed with the
liquor division as part of its inventory and distribution operation.
(c) Before sending any shipment to a household or to a licensed retailer in this state,
the out-of-state shipper shall:
(i) File an application with the liquor division of the department of
revenue;
(ii) Pay a license fee of ﬁfty dollars ($50.00) to the liquor division;
(iii) Provide a true copy of its current alcoholic liquor or malt beverage
license issued in its state of domicile to the liquor division;
(iv) Provide such other information as may be required by the liquor
division; and
(v) Obtain from the liquor division an out-of-state shipper’s license, after
the division conducts such investigation as it deems necessary.

Id.
See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204(b) (2006); see also WYO. STAT. ANN. § 12-2-204(c)
(2006); The Associated Press, Committee Passes Wine Bill, BILLINGS GAZETTE, Feb. 15, 2006, available at http://www.billingsgazette.net/articles/2006/02/15/news/wyoming/60-wine-bill.txt. (“A bill
186
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New York’s laws at issue in Granholm, where less restrictive means of achieving
the States’ intended goals exist (as is the case with Illinois House Bill 429) the law
should be found unconstitutional.

The Three-Tier System
The three-tier system, which allows only in-state (domestic) wholesalers to sell
wines to retailers, also violates the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce
Clause.187 The ﬁrst prong of Granholm is easily satisﬁed.188 The practice of forcing
out-of-state wineries to sell their products to domestic wholesalers, but forbidding
out-of-state wholesalers a similar privilege is a clear case of discrimination.189 In
fact, no state employing the three-tier system affords the opportunity to participate
in the sale and distribution of wine to out-of-state distributors.190 Only in-state
ﬁrms may distribute wine directly to retailers.191
As stated above, the Court acknowledged time and again that it has
invalidated laws mandating differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that beneﬁts the former and burdens the latter as virtually per
se invalid.192 With this proclamation in mind, the Court should have taken steps
to properly address the three-tier system and found it to be an unconstitutional
burden on interstate commerce when the distribution of wine is permitted only
by in-state distributors.
Under the second prong of the analysis, the Court determines whether the
proposed state interest can be achieved by other, less burdensome regulations.193
If there are sufﬁciently reasonable alternatives, discriminatory laws are struck
down.194 If the Court evaluated the three-tier system, it is reasonable to conclude

bringing Wyoming into compliance with a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on direct wine shipment to
consumers unanimously passed.”); Wyoming Close to Compliance, http://www.shipcompliantblog.
com/index.php?s=wyoming (Feb. 16, 2006).
187
See Vidram David Amar, The Fight Over State Laws Favoring In-State Alcohol Purveyors: Do
Such Laws Violate the Dormant Commerce Clause? A Federal District Court in New York Says No, But
May Well Be Wrong, http://writ.news.ﬁndlaw.com/amar/20071012.html (last visited on November
18, 2007).
188

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 472-76.

189

See id. at 476 (holding Michigan’s and New York’s direct shipping regulatory schemes violate
the Commerce Clause’s nondiscrimination principle).
190

See generally Ship Compliant Blog, http://shipcompliantblog.com/ (last visited on November
15, 2007).
191

Id.

192

See Granholm, 544 U.S. at 489.

193

Id.

194

Id.
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it would have found that the evidence listed below indicates that less burdensome
alternatives exist for the states to achieve their proposed goals of promoting
temperance, raising revenue, and restricting access to alcohol for minors.195

Less Restrictive Alternatives to the Three-Tier System
In July of 2003, the Federal Trade Commission published ﬁndings and
recommendations from a workshop intended to discuss possible anti-competitive
barriers to wine and other industries.196 The commission heard testimony from
state regulators, vintners, wholesalers, and consumers.197 After review of testimony
and its own studies, the commission found that states could “signiﬁcantly enhance
consumer welfare by allowing direct shipments of wine.”198 Furthermore, the
commission found that state mandated bans on e-commerce and direct shipping,
increases prices, limits consumer selection, and does little to keep alcohol out of
the hands of minors.199
Proponents of the three-tier system argue the system furthers the goals of
collecting taxes, reducing access to alcohol by minors, and preventing organized

195
FTC Report, supra note 100, at 26. “In practice, many states have decided that they can
prevent direct shipping to minors through less restrictive means than a complete ban, such as
by requiring an adult signature at the point of delivery. These states generally report few, if any,
problems with direct shipping to minors.” Id.

As an alternative to banning interstate direct shipment of wine, some states have
adopted less restrictive means to satisfy their regulatory objectives. For example,
some states register out-of-state suppliers and impose various civil and criminal
penalties against violators. Several states, including Nebraska, New Hampshire, and
Wyoming, require out-of-state suppliers to register and obtain permits (a permit
can be conditioned on the out-of-state supplier’s consent to submit to the state’s
jurisdiction). None of these states reported any problems with interstate direct
shipping to minors.
Id. at 27.
Courts have suggested that in addition to regulating the suppliers, states also could
develop statutory systems that would impose similar requirements on package
delivery companies as on retail stores. One court concluded that ‘[t]here is no
practical difference from requiring such a procedure and that required of store clerks
or bartenders who regularly check customers for valid identiﬁcation to verify age
before allowing the sale of alcoholic beverages.’ For instance, Michigan requires that
retailers make a “diligent inquiry” to verify a customer’s age, such as by examining
a picture identiﬁcation. States could impose similar requirements on delivery
personnel, including training requirements, along with appropriate penalties.
Id. at 29 (internal citations omitted).
196

Id.

197

Id. at 2.

198

Id. at 3.

199

Id.
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crime from gaining control of alcohol distribution.200 Proponents also argue that
disbanding the three-tier system in favor of direct shipping options for consumers
is contrary to these goals.201
The ﬁndings of the Federal Trade Commission indicate differently.202 These
ﬁndings indicate that the system does not further the goals it was designed
for better than alternatives.203 For example, advocates of the three-tier system
claim it is necessary to ensure revenue collection.204 According to the Federal
Trade Commission, of those states that do allow direct-to-consumer shipping
of alcohol, few report problems with the remittance of taxes.205 Likewise, many
states allowing direct shipping report few problems restricting access to alcohol
for minors.206 Finally, most, if not all producers, are willing to submit themselves
to aggregate customer purchase limits in furtherance of temperance goals.207

The Three-Tier System Equals Higher Prices for Consumers
According to the Federal Trade Commission the three-tier system increases
the price of wine for consumers.208 These ﬁndings indicate that when purchased
over the Internet, wine is typically sixteen percent cheaper than when purchased
at traditional brick-and-mortar retail establishments and this percentage of
savings increases with the price of the wine.209 The study also suggests that by
buying online, consumers can forgo the costs normally added on at the wholesale
level which can be upwards of eighteen to twenty-ﬁve percent more than buying
the same bottles online.210 Even the Fourth Circuit recognized that “wine sold
through the three-tiered system is more expensive than the same or comparable

200

Tr. Brief of Def. & Def.-Intervenor at, 13. Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (No.
03-1120). “The evidence offered at trial will show not only that the State has clear and expressed
interests in regulating the distribution and sale of alcoholic beverages but also that those interests
relate directly to the core concerns of the [Twenty-ﬁrst] Amendment.” Id. “One of the greatest
concerns . . . has been how to moderate and control the consumption of alcoholic beverages.” Id.
“[T]he goal of Washington’s . . . Act . . . is the generation of tax revenue.” Id. at 14. “One of the
key purposes . . . of a system regulating alcoholic beverages [is] . . . to facilitate orderly market
conditions.” Id.; see also FTC Report, supra note 100, at 6.
201

Tr. Brief of Def. & Def.-Intervenor, supra note 200, at 13.

202

FTC Report, supra note 100, at 26-40.

203

Id.

204

Id. at 5.

205

Id. at 38.

206

Id. at 26-38.

207

FTC Report, supra note 100, at 28.

208

Id. at 19, 26-38.

209

Id.

210

Id.
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wine sold in-state [directly to consumers] because wine distributed through the
three-tiered structure is subjected to two ‘mark-ups’ in price . . . .”211
The ﬁndings of the Federal Trade Commission illustrate that the three-tier
system is not, as many states contend, necessary to achieve effective regulation
of alcohol.212 One thing apparent from these ﬁndings is that less restrictive
alternatives exist to achieve these goals.213 Additionally, these alternatives not only
serve small start-up and boutique producers who would gain market access, they
also serve consumers by lowering prices and increasing variety.214
These alternatives also continue to ensure adequate tax revenue and maintain
restrictions on minors.215 If the ﬁndings of the Federal Trade Commission show
anything, they show that the three-tier system is not necessary.216 If states insist
on maintaining the three-tier system, these ﬁndings are applicable to instances
where the three-tier system prohibits market access by out-of-state wholesalers
who, like retailers, will happily submit to each state’s jurisdiction and licensing
requirements.217 Therefore, the three-tier system is not the only manner that
the “core concerns” of section two of the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment can be
achieved.218

CONCLUSION
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Granholm, proscriptions against
out-of-state retailers and wholesalers should be found unconstitutional because
they regulate in-state and out-of-state interests in an uneven manner.219 The
Court has held that the Twenty-ﬁrst Amendment gives the states broad authority
to regulate alcohol as long as it does so on evenhanded terms. Therefore, the
Court needs to revisit its analysis of the three-tier system using the framework it
has set forth in Granholm and revoke the rubber stamp it has mistakenly given to
the system. The majority has already recognized that where reasonable alternatives
exist, burdensome regulations will not be tolerated. As this note has shown,
alternatives are easily implemented which practically achieve the States’ regulatory
goals while simultaneously promoting the principles of economic unity that our
republic was founded upon.
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